Derrida & Roudinesco: 'De que amanhã...' (corpo sem sujeito?)

 

ER: Percebo barbárie em certas manifestações cientificistas, [...], na medida em que se trata fundamentalmente, sempre, de reduzir o humano a um corpo sem sujeito. É útil a meu ver reler, a esse propósito, a famosa conferência de Georges Canguilhem, "O cérebro e o pensamento", na qual denuncia como uma barbárie qualquer forma de psicologia que pretendesse se apoiar na biologia e na fisiologia para afirmar que o pensamento seria apenas efeito de uma secreção do cérebro...

JD: Reações ético-jurídicas na deveriam se moelar nessa caricatura cientificista...

ER: Os partidários do que chamamos de cognitivo-comportamentalismo acreditam realmente que um dia poderemos prescindir totalmente dos conceitos de sujeito, de inconsciente e consciência...

JD: O direito ocidental é o lugar próprio, um lugar privilegiado em todo caso, da emergência e d autoridade do sujeito, do conceito de sujeito. Se ele está mantido no direito, está por toda a parte. Como extirparíamos o sujeito do direito?

ER: Como uma sobrevivência necessária para a representação do laço social. Nesse contexto, tratar-se ia de manter a existência de um sujeito da ética ou da responsabilidade, desprovido de qualquer ancoragem numa realidade psíquica, afetiva, pulsional. Isso nada tem a ver, naturalmente, com o sujeito da ética de que fala Foucault e que é um sujeito em vias de se inventar desprendendo-se de si mesmo...

* * *

JD: ... É preciso também saber que sem algum não-saber, nada acontece que mereça o nome de "acontecimento".

Jacques Derrida & Elisabeth Roudinesco, 'De que amanhã...', Rio de Janeiro: Jorge Zahar Ed., 2004.

 

 

 

A moral (sem fundamento) - André Comte-Sponville

 

    "[É esse o sentido da] famosa formulação kantiana do imperativo categórico, nos Fundamentos da mestafísica dos costumes: 'aja unicamente de acordo com uma máxima tal que você possa querer que ela se torne uma lei universal." Isso é agir de acordo com a humanidade, em vez de conforme o seu 'euzinho querido', e obedecer à sua razão em vez de às suas tendências ou aos seus interesses. Uma ação só é boa se o princípio a que se submete (sua 'máxima') puder valer, de direito, para todos: agir moralmente é agir de tal sorte que você possa desejar, sem contradição, que todo indivíduo se submeta aos mesmos princípios que você. Isso coincide com o espírito dos Evangelhos ou com o espírito da humanidade (encontramos formulações equivalentes em outras religiões), cuja 'máxima sublime' Rousseau assim enuncia: 'Faz com os outros o que queres que os outros te façam.' Isso também coincide, mais modestamente, mais lucidamente, com o espírito da compaixão, de que Rousseau, ele de novo, nos á a fórmula 'muito menos perfeita, porém mais útil talvez que a precedente: Faz teu bem fazendo o menor mal possível aos outros'. Isso é viver, ao menos em parte, de acordo com o outro, ou antes, de acordo consigo, mas na medida em que julgamos e pensamos. 'Sozinho, universalmente...', dizia Alain. É a própria moral.

    Será preciso um fundamento para legitimar essa moral? Não é necessário, nem tem de ser possível. Uma criança está se afogando. Você precisa de um fundamento para salvá-la? Um tirano massacra, oprime, tortura... Você precisa de um fundamento para combatê-lo? Um fundamento seria uma verdade inconteste, que viria garantir o valor dos nossos valores: isso nos permitiria demonstrar, inclusive àquele que não os compartilha, que temos razão e ele não. Mas, para tanto, seria preciso fundar a razão, o que não é possível. Que demonstração sem um princípio prévio, que seria preciso demonstrar previamente? E que fundamento, tratando-se de valores, não pressupõe a própria moral que ele pretende fundar? Ao indivíduo que pusesse o egoísmo acima da generosidade, a mentira acima da sinceridade, a violência ou a crueldade acima da doçura ou da compaixão, como demonstrar que está errado e que importância daria ele a tal demonstração? A quem só pensa em si, que importa o pensamento? A quem só vive para si, que importa o universal? Quem não hesita em profanar a liberdade do outro, a dignidade do outro, por que respeitaria o princípio de não contradição? E por que, para combatê-lo, seria preciso ter primeiramente os meios para refutá-lo? O horror não se refuta. O mal não se refuta. Contra a violência, contra a crueldade, contra a barbárie, necessitamos menos de um fundamento do que de coragem. E diante de nós mesmos, menos de um fundamento do que de exigência e de fidelidade. Trata-se de não ser indigno do que a humanidade fez de cada um, e de todos nós. Por que precisaríamos, para tanto de um fundamento ou de uma garantia? Como seriam eles possíveis? A vontade basta, e vale mais."

André Comte-Sponville, Apresentação da Filosofia, São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 2002.

David Lodge - Nice Work (quotes)

 

"And there, for the time being, let us leave Vic Wilcox, while we travel back an hour or two in time, a few miles in space, to meet a very different character. A character who, rather awkwardly for me, doesn't herself believe in the concept of character. That is to say (a favourite phrase of her own), Robyn Penrose, Temporary Lecturer in English Literature at the University of Rummidge, holds that 'character' is a bourgeois myth, an illusion created to reinforce the ideology of capitalism. As evidence for this assertion she will point to the fact that the rise of the novel (the literary genre of 'character' par excellence) in the eighteenth century coincided with the rise of capitalism; that the triumph of the novel over all other literary genres in the nineteenth century coincided with the trimph of capitalism; and that the modernist and postmodernist deconstruction of the classic novel in the twentieth century coincided with the terminal crisis of capitalism.

    Why the classic novel should have collaborated with the spirit o capitalism is perfectly obvious for Robyn. Both are expressions of secularized Protestant ethic, both dependent on the idea of an autonomous individual self who is responsible for and in control of his/her own destiny, seeking happiness and fortune in competition with other autonomous selves. This is true of the novel considered both as commodity and as mode of representation. (Thus Robyn in full seminar spate.) That is to say, it applies to novelists themselves as well as to their heroes and heroines. The novelist is a capitalist of the imagination. He or she invents a product which consumers didn't know they wanted until it is made available, manufactures it with the assistance of purveyors of risk capital known as publishers, and sells it in competition with makers of marginally differentiated products of the same kind. The first major English novelist, Daniel Defoe, was a merchant. The second, Sanuel Richardson, was a printer. The novel was the first mass-produced cultural artefact. (At this point Robyn, with elbows tucked into her sides, would spread her hands outwards from the wrist, as if to imply that there is no need to say more. But of course she always has much more to say.)

    According to Robyn (or, more precisely, according to the writers who have influenced her thinking on these matters), there is no such thing as the 'self' on which capitalism and the classic novel are founded - that is to say, a finite, unique soul or essence that constitutes a person's identity; there is only a subject position in an infinite web of discourses - the discourses of power, sex, family, science, religion, poetry, etc. And by the same token, there is no such thing as an author, that is to say, one who originates a work of fiction ab nihilo. Every text is a product of intertextuality, a tissue of allusions to and citations of other texts; and, in the famous words of Jacques Derrida (famous to people like Robyn, anyway), 'il n'y a pas de hors-texte', there is nothing outside the text. There are no origins, there is only production, and we produce our 'selves' in language. Not 'you are what you eat' but 'you are what you speak' or, rather 'you are what speaks you', is the axiomatic basis of Robyn's philosophy, which she would call, if required to give it a name, 'semiotic materialism'. It might seem a bit bleak, a bit inhuman ('antihumanist, yes; inhuman, no,' she would interject), somewhat deterministic ('not at all; the truly determined subject is he who is not aware of the discursive formations that determine him. Or her,' she would add scrupulously, being among other things a feminist), but in practice this doesn't seem to affect her behaviour very noticeably - she seems to have ordinary human feelings, ambitions, desires, to suffer anxieties, frustrations, fears, like anyone else in this imperfect world, and to have a natural inclination to try and make it a better place. I shall therefore take the liberty of treating her as a character, ot utterly different in kind, though of course belonging to a very different social species, from Vic Wilcox" (p. 39-41).

*  *  *

    "'But doesn't it bother you at all?' Robyn said. 'That the things we care so passionately about - for instance, whether Derrida's critique of metaphysics lets idealism in by the back door, or whether Lacan's psychoanalytic theory is phallogocentric, or whether Foucault's theory of the episteme is reconciliable with dialectical materialism - things like that, which we argue about and read about and write about endlessly - doesn't it worry you that ninety-nine point nine per cent of the population couldn't give a monkey's?'" (p. 217).

*  *  *

    "'But repetition is death! Robyn cried. 'Difference is life. Difference is the condition of meaning. Language is a system of differences, as Saussure said'" (p. 351).

David Lodge, Nice Work, Penguin Books, 1989 (Secker & Warburg,1988).

David Lodge - Small World (quotes)

 

   "I wouldn't call myself a structuralist," Morris Zapp interrupted, "A post-structuralist, perhaps."

    Philip Swallow made a gesture implying impatience with such subtle distinctions. "I refer to that fundamental scepticism about the possibility of achieving certainty about anything, which I associate with the mischievous influence of Continental theorizing. There was a time when reading was a comparatively simple matter, something you learned to do in primary school. Now it seems to be some kind of arcane mistery, into which only a small élite have been initiated. I have been reading books for their meaning all my life - or at least that is what I have always thought I was doing. Apparently I was mistaken."

    "You weren't mistaken about what you were trying to do," said Morris Zapp, relighting his cigar, "you were mistaken in trying to do it."

    "I have just one question," said Philip Swallow. "It is this: what, with the greatest respect, is the point of our discussing your paper, if, according to your own theory, we should not be discussing what you actually said at all, but discussing some imperfect memory or subjective interpretation of what you said?"

    "There is no point," said Morris Zapp blithely. "If by point you mean the hope of arriving at some certain truth. But when did you ever discover that in a question-and-discussion session? Be honest, have you ever been to a lecture or seminar at the end of which you could have found two people present who could agree on the simplest précis of what had been said?"

    "Then, what in God's name is the point of it all?" cried Philip Swallow, throwing his hands into the air. 

    "The point, of course, is to uphold the institution of academic literary studies. We mantain our position in society by publicly performing a certain ritual, just like any other group of workers in the realm of discourse - lawyers, politicians, journalists. And as it looks as if we have done our duty for today, shall we all adjourn for a drink?" - (p. 27-28).

*  *  *

"He tries to suppress his own knowledge of what comes next, tries no to see the crucial passage looming ahead. He is trying to trick his own brain. Don't look, don't look! Keep going, keep going! Gather all your strength up into one ball, ready to spring, NOW!

    The question is, therefore, how can literary criticism mantain its Arnoldian function of identifying the best which has been thought and said, when literary discourse itself has been decentred by deconstructing the traditional concept of the author, of 'authority'. Clearly

Yes, clearly...?

  

    Clearly

Clearly what?

[...] Rodney Wainwright slumps forward onto his desk and buries his face in his hands. Beaten again" (p. 140).

*  *  *

 "He [Rudyard Parkinson] had never heard of Philip Swallow, and a first book by a redbrick professor did not promise much. As he riffled the pages, however, his attention was caught by a quotation from an essay of Hazzlitt's entitled "On Criticism": "A critic does nothing nowadays who does not try to torture the most obvious expression into a thousand meanings... His object indeed is not to do justice to his author, whom he treats with very little ceremony, but to do himself homage, and to show his acquaintance with all the topics and resources of criticism" (p. 161).

*  *  *

"As usual, he wasted a great deal of time wondering which books to take on his journey. He had a neurotic fear of finding himself stranded in some foreign hotel or railway station with nothing to read, and in consequence always travelled with far too many books, most of which he brought home unread" (p. 165).

*  *  *

"For a man who claims to believe in the morally improving effects of reading great literature, Philip Swallow (it seems to Morris) takes his marriage vows pretty lightly" (p. 249).

*  *  *

"Do you know what she said? 'Professor Tardieu, it is not what you say that impresses me most, it is what your are silent about: ideas, morality, love, death, things... This notebook' - she fluttered its vacant pages - 'is the record of your profound silences. Vos silences profonds'" (p. 265).

*  *  *

    "Right, you can get anything you want by telephone in this city: Chinese food, massage, yoga lessons, acupuncture. You can even all up girls who will talk to you dirty to you for so much a minute. You pay bay credit car. But if you're into deconstruction, you can just watch all these trailers in a row as if it was one, free, avant-garde movie. Mind you," he added pensively, "I've rather lost faith in deconstruction. I guess it showed this afternoon."

    "You mean every decoding is not another encoding after all?"

    "Oh it is, it is. But the deferral of meaning isn't infinite as far as the individual is concerned."

    "I thought deconstructionists didn't believe in the individual."

    "They don't. But death is the one concept you can't deconstruct. Work back from there and you end up with the old idea of an autonomous self. I can die, therefore I am. I realized that when those wop radicals threatened to deconstruct me" (p. 328).

David Lodge, Small World, Penguin Books, 1995 (Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd., 1984).